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Does a Rising Biofuels Tide Raise All Boats?
A Study of Cash Rent Determinants for Iowa
Farmland under Hay and Pasture
Xiaodong Du, David A. Hennessy, and William M. Edwards
Iowa’s farmland consists of over 16% hay crops and pastureland, a significant portion of
which is under cash rental contracts. This study investigates the comparative relationships
between cash rental rates for cropped land and non-cropped land, where the latter includes
hay and pastureland. We find that higher crop prices resulting from biofuel demand
induces land use conversion from non-cropped land to crop production and thus bids up
non-cropped land rents. Compared with changes in cropped land cash rents, non-cropped
farmland rents could increase by a higher percentage. Non-cropped land cash rental rates
are largely determined by crop and feeder cattle prices, population density, soil quality, and
proportion of non-cropped land in a specific area. A primary effect of ethanol subsidies
is the redistribution of income between corn growers and livestock producers, whereby
higher livestock feed costs together with increasing hay and pastureland cash rents harm
the dairy and feedlot beef sectors. Our study shows that, because of the positive effect on
rents, the policies have an indeterminate effect on landowners operating in the cow-calf
sector.
Key words: biofuel, pastureland, cash rents, random effects model.
JEL classification: C5, G1, Q1.
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Although the state of Iowa is well known for corn and soybean production, about 5% of the
farmland acres in the state are devoted to hay crops and 11% to pasture (2002 Census of
Agriculture). An estimated 60% of the hay and pasture acres are farmed under rental contracts
(Iowa State University Extension, 2008), almost all of which involve fixed cash rental payments.
If both food and fuel are to be provided by farmland, then lower-quality land in the more fertile
regions will need to be cropped. This indeed occurred between 2004 and 2007, when acres
planted to corn and soybeans grew by 1.3% in Iowa, and the response will likely increase if
Conservation Reserve Program acres leave that program. About 720,000 program acres in Iowa
have contract expiration dates between 2009 and 2013.1 In order to understand what incentives
are needed for this acreage reallocation response to occur, and so be better positioned to learn
about environmental consequences, a better understanding of factors determining cash rental
rates on non-prime farmland is required.
In 2007, 2.2 billion bushels of corn (or 23% of U.S. production) were used to produce ethanol.
Farm-level corn prices increased from an average of $2.06 per bushel in 2004/05 to an average
price of $6.73 a bushel in the second quarter of 2008. Over the same periods, average soybean
farm-level prices jumped from $6.43 per bushel to $10.10 per bushel, increasing animal feed
costs correspondingly. According to Iowa State University Extension (1994-2008), this rising
demand for corn has pushed up cropland cash rental rates by almost 18% between spring 2007
and spring 2008. The main goals of this study are to investigate how non-cropped land rents
relate to cropped land cash rental rates, and how cash rents on non-cropped farmland respond
to prices.
Ethanol production and use in the United States depend heavily on a variety of public
policy supports (Elobeid and Tokgoz, 2008). From the political economy perspective, the
major purposes of government intervention are to support economic surplus and to redistribute
1See http://www.fsa.usda.gov/FSA/webapp?area=home&subject=copr&topic=crp-st, last visited
9/30/2008.
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efficiently that surplus among interested parties. The policy choice outcome is the result of
political competition among interested groups. The equilibrium choice is largely determined by
the socio-economic characteristics of interest groups (Gardner, 1985). In agricultural markets,
factors that determine the political power of a commodity group include, for example, the
number of producers, their geographical dispersion, and the importance of the commodity to
producers’ income. Mancur Olson’s framework for studying incentives for potential beneficiaries
to form rent-seeking coalitions has proven to be very useful (Olson, 1982). He noted that large
heterogeneous groups with low per-capita potential gains will countenance relatively high costs
and low benefit-to-cost ratios when attempting to organize for collective action. In political
competitions, therefore, groups with large and focused per-capita potential gains may coalesce
to win over groups who are less competitive in these regards.
For policy on corn-derived ethanol, there are several involved groups in agricultural and
energy markets. These include corn growers, a variety of livestock producers, ethanol producers,
and the petroleum industry, in addition to owners and renters of farmland. Although not small
in number, corn growers tend to be homogeneous in their economic interests and thus are quite
well positioned relative to taxpayers in the policy decision-making process. Livestock producers
are not a homogeneous group, differing in the feedstuffs used and the stages of production. Many
feel their political capital is best spent on ensuring access to public grazing and raising concerns
about other issues, such as contractual relations, concentration in output markets, and animal
identification policy. In the United States, and perhaps because of a history of cooperating
to market milk, only the dairy sector has traditionally been a significant direct beneficiary of
policies involving income transfers. This quiescence may have been due in part to the belief
that policies promoting the domestic supply of grain reduce the cost of feed and so promote
competitiveness in important international meat and dairy markets.
The reasoning may no longer be valid, and corn users are organizing to influence biofuels
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policy. Early in 2008, the U.S. Grocery Manufacturers Association initiated funding of a public
relations campaign aimed at reducing support for pro-ethanol policies. Officials representing
the U.S. chicken, turkey, and beef production sectors have also expressed strong desires to relax
policies promoting corn-derived ethanol (Salvage, 2008). While corn growers clearly benefit
from pro-ethanol policies, the livestock sector is generally harmed by the high corn prices that
result. So, partly driven by relative competitiveness in rent-seeking, one primary effect of
ethanol subsidies is to redistribute income between corn growers and livestock producers.
Roughly 60% of all the corn produced in the United States is used domestically for feed
grain, so higher crop prices lead to higher livestock production costs. Higher feed costs should
lead to lower prices for feeder cattle leaving pasture since feedlots will not bid if the expected
future price for fed cattle less the current feeder cattle price is less than the cost of fattening,
in which feed is the most important input. But, as we shall show, higher crop prices also likely
increase hay and pastureland rents. This has a separate adverse effect on the beef and dairy
sectors in addition to a positive effect on returns to land in those sectors. Thus, the overall
effect on landowners who farm in these sectors is unclear without further study.
There are a limited number of studies on farmland cash rental rates. Krause and Brorsen
(1995) focus on the effect of risk on agricultural land rents, in which risk is defined as variation
in the difference between expected revenues and actual revenues. Cropland cash rental rates
in the Upper Mississippi River Basin are estimated in Kurkalova, Burkart, and Secchi (2004)
based on corn yield estimates. Dhuyvetter and Kastens (2002) use a cost-based method to
study the cash rental rate in Kansas over the period 1982-2001. Du, Hennessy, and Edwards
(2007) investigate the determinants of Iowa cropland cash rental rates using the Ricardian rent
framework. They estimate short- and long-run cash rent responses to corn price changes.
Cash rental rates on other types of non-cropped farmland have not received much attention
in the literature, perhaps because data have not been available. Data from the survey we
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will use indicate non-cropped land cash rental receipts at $550 million for Iowa in 2008, so
even a cursory overview shows the issue to be of substantial practical relevance. Several farm
extension reports discuss the basic methods that can be used to determine cash rental rates for
non-cropland, including grass and pastureland (e.g., Hofstrand and Edwards, 2003; Pflueger,
2007).
This study is organized as follows. A theoretical model is developed in the next section. Then
we describe data on cash rental rates for five types of farmland and provides a preliminarily
analysis of how they relate. Our empirical analysis follows, which includes analyses of change
in cropped land as a share of all farmed land. Determinants of cash rental rates for farmland
under hay and grazing are also considered. We close with a discussion of our major findings,
as well as suggestions for further study.
Model
Land in a region is heterogeneous, where productivity index θ follows distribution G(θ) : [0, 1]→
[0, 1], the normalizations on domain and range being without loss of generality. There are two
uses for the land, namely, in crops and in feeder cattle production (or grassland). In crop
production the output price is pc, while in feeder cattle production the output price is pf . Let
Θ be the land productivity set such that land is cropped whenever θ ∈ Θ, and let IΘ be the
indicator function for this set, i.e., IΘ = 1 if θ ∈ Θ and 0 otherwise. With Sc(θ, ·) as the
economic surplus from cropland of productivity and Sf (θ, ·) as that from grazed land, then
aggregate surplus amounts to
(1) W (·) =
∫
Θ
Sc(θ, ·)IΘdG(θ) +
∫
Θ
Sf (θ, ·) (1− IΘ) dG(θ)
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There are no externalities or market power effects in our model, so we may invoke the first
fundamental welfare theorem to assert that this measure of aggregate surplus is maximized in
market equilibrium.
With feeder production cost per acre at κf , let feeder productivity for the most productive
operator be m(θ), an increasing function, or m(θ) ≥ 0 . Let the decline in productivity be given
by function A[·] and, tentatively, write Sf (θ, ·) = m(θ)A[x]pf − κf . Here, x is the fraction of
acres in pasture. The larger the fraction of land in pasture, the smaller should be productivity
at the margin because less-productive operators will be drawn in at the margin. If only low
productivity acres enter pasture then we may specify the measure of low productivity acres G(·)
as the argument in A[x]. For the state of Iowa, only a small fraction of very low productivity
land is cropped while only a low fraction of very high productivity land is grazed. This is
because corn and soybean seed, materials, and annual cultivation costs are high so that a
critical threshold crop yield must be obtained, while perennial grass and hay production is less
costly.
Now as m(θ) is increasing in θ the value of A[x] should be largest at the land quality level
where there is indifference between the use the acre is put to, which we label θˆ . In line with
the above we may write the θ-dependent value of productivity as
(2) A[x(θ)] = A
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
, A[0] = 1;
so that A
[
G(θˆ)−G(θ)
]
decreases as θ decreases toward 0. The fully specified feeder cattle
surplus function is
(3) Sf (θ, θˆ) = m(θ)A
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
pf − κf .
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To interpret, if more acres are drawn into pasture (i.e., θˆ rises) then the value of
∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
rises, the value of A
[
G(θˆ)−G(θ)
]
falls, and economic surplus on land with attribute θ should
fall. This is because operators less suited to feeder cattle production have been drawn into the
sector.
Notice that
dSf (θ, θˆ)
dθ
= mθ(θ)A
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
pf −m(θ)A′
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
g(θ)pf > 0;
dSf (θ, θˆ)
dθˆ
= m(θ)A′
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
g(θˆ)pf < 0;(4)
with A′[·] as the derivative of A[·] with respect to the value of its integral argument. The first
derivative in (4) is positive in part because better land quality should generate a larger surplus
in and of itself. This explains the first right-hand term in the derivative. The second right-hand
term in the first equation arises because better operators match with that land. The effect of
an increase in the threshold type on surplus for any given land quality in pasture is due to the
fact that when θˆ rises then better operators are drawn away from renting pastureland not at
the margin.
To see why better operators operate better land in our model, consider when θ = θh for
fraction δ of land at issue and θ = θl < θh for the remainder. Now m(θh)A(δ) + m(θl)A(1) −
m(θh)A(1) − m(θl)A(δ) = [m(θh) − m(θl)][A(δ) − A(1)] > 0. If better land is not allocated
to more efficient operators then surplus is not maximized and the market could do better
by facilitating the switch. Complementarity between operator skills and land quality ensures
there is matching in the sense of Becker (1973). Note that this feature of the model is not at
all necessary for our analysis. But realism requires that we model heterogeneity in operator
efficiency so that we do need some approach to matching operators with land.
Turning to cropland, let cropping cost per acre be κc and let feeder productivity for the
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most productive operator be n(θ), increasing in θ. For crops, let the decline in productivity be
given by function B[y] and write Sc(θ, pc) = n(θ)B[y]pc−κc. Here, y is the fraction of cropped
acres where, as with pasture, the larger the fraction, the smaller should be productivity at
the margin. Since only high-productivity acres enter cropping, we may specify the measure of
high-productivity acres G¯(·) = 1−G(·) as the argument in B[·]. Similar to (2), write
(5) B[·] = B
[∫ 1
θ
dG(s)
]
, B[0] = 1;
so that when θ = 1 then B[G¯(θ)] = 1 and B[G¯(θ)] decreases as θ decreases toward θˆ. The fully
specified crop operation surplus function is
(6) Sc(θ) = n(θ)B
[∫ 1
θ
dG(s)
]
pc − κc
where θˆ does not matter in this case. This is because there is no acreage re-matching, with
growers as the best growers always renting the θ = 1 land.
Total surplus expression (1) simplifies to
W (θˆ) =
∫ 1
θˆ
(
n(θ)B
[∫ 1
θ
dG(s)
]
pc − κc
)
dG(θ)
+
∫ θˆ
0
(
m(θ)A
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
pf − κf
)
dG(θ),(7)
with optimality derivative
Wθˆ(θˆ) = −Sc(θˆ)g(θˆ) + Sf (θˆ, θˆ)g(θˆ) + T (θˆ)g(θˆ) = 0;
Sc(θˆ) = n(θ)B
[∫ 1
θˆ
dG(s)
]
pc − κc > 0; Sf (θˆ, θˆ) = m(θˆ)pf − κf > 0;
T (θˆ) = pf
∫ θˆ
0
m(θ)A′
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
dG(θ) < 0;(8)
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and the second-order concavity condition is assumed. The optimality condition may be rewrit-
ten as
(9) Sc(θ) = Sf (θˆ, θˆ) + T (θˆ).
Here, Sc(θ) is surplus on cropland at the extensive margin and Sf (θˆ, θˆ) is that on pastureland
at the extensive margin. Expression T (θˆ) represents the (intensive margin) effect of an increase
in threshold θˆ on feeder surplus due to operator heterogeneity and, more specifically, to the
market mechanisms allowing for advantage to be taken of this heterogeneity.
The average economic surplus for pastureland (i.e., the aggregate divided by the fraction of
land in pasture) is
(10) S¯f (θˆ) =
pf
∫ θˆ
0
A
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
dG(θ)
G(θˆ)
− κf .
This formula is consistent with the survey data we will study, in which the survey asks for
typical rents on land under a given use and not for rent on land of a given quality.
Differentiate with respect to pc to obtain
(11)
dS¯f (θˆ)
dpc
=
{Sf (θˆ, θˆ) + T (θˆ)− S¯f (θˆ)}
G(θˆ)
g(θˆ)
dθˆ
dpc
.
Now differentiation of equation (9) ensures that
(12)
dθˆ
dpc
= −
n(θˆ)B
[∫ 1
θˆ
dG(s)
]
Sc
θˆ
(θˆ)− Sf
θˆ
(θˆ, θˆ)− Tθˆ(θˆ)
< 0;
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since Sc
θˆ
(θˆ)− Sf
θˆ
(θˆ, θˆ)− Tθˆ(θˆ) > 0 in light of welfare function concavity.2 If dθˆ/dpc < 0 then
(13)
dS¯f (θˆ)
dpc
sign
= −{Sf (θˆ, θˆ) + T (θˆ)− S¯f (θ, θˆ)},
where dSf (θ, θˆ)/dθ > 0 in equation (4) implies Sf (θˆ, θˆ) > S¯f (θ, θˆ). This is because the average
over θ ∈ [0, θˆ] of a function that is increasing in θ must be smaller than the function when
evaluated at θ ∈ θˆ. In addition, (8) has T (θˆ) < 0.
Thus there are two effects. Both are premised on the assumption that an increase in crop
prices reduces the amount of pastureland, or dθˆ/dpc < 0. Observation Sf (θˆ, θˆ) > S¯f (θ, θˆ) is a
supply-side effect. It has that an increase in crop prices increases the amount of cropped land,
draws from better land, reduces average pastureland quality, and so reduces average pastureland
rent. Observation T (θˆ) < 0 is a demand-side effect. It has that when the amount of pastureland
decreases there is more demand for the remaining pastureland from those most committed to
feeder cattle production. On this account, average surplus on pastureland should increase.
Whether this demand-side effect outweighs the supply-side effect is an empirical matter.
Rents Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this study, we used annual survey data of farmland cash rental rates collected by Iowa
State University Extension over the period 1994-2008 (Iowa State University Extension, 1994-
2008). The survey is sent each year to over 3,000 landowners, tenants, farm managers, lenders
and educators who are knowledgeable about cash rental rates for farmland in their county.
Respondents are asked to state what they think a typical cash rental rate in a specific county
(or counties) is for land devoted to various crops. No other county-level land rent survey of its
kind has been collected consistently for this length of time in the United States.
2See the appendix for consideration of second-order conditions.
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The survey collects typical cash rental rates for (a) farmland with relatively high soil quality
devoted to row crop production, including corn and soybeans; and (b) lower-quality farmland
used for forage crops. For the sake of brevity in presentation, we refer to land under row crops as
cropped land and all other land (including that under hay) as non-cropped land. Non-cropped
land is subdivided into the following categories: alfalfa hay, grass hay, improved permanent
pasture, and unimproved permanent pasture. Hay land is assumed to have an existing stand of
hay, that is, the renter does not have to pay the initial costs of establishing the hay crop. The
establishment costs would be presumed to be capitalized into the rental rate. Some alfalfa and
grass may be harvested as haylage (green) rather than dry hay, but that was assumed to have
no effect on the rental rate. Improved pasture was assumed to have been renovated or reseeded
in recent years, to contain some legume species, and to be regularly fertilized. Unimproved
pasture was assumed to be on old stands of mostly grass, with little or no maintenance. By
far the most common use of pastureland is to graze beef cows and young cattle and, to a lesser
extent, dairy cattle and sheep.
The data from the survey are collected by county. However, the response rate for hay and
pasture rental rates is too low for many counties to report average values (fewer than five
responses). Each year the data are aggregated into 12 geographical areas, containing 7 to 10
counties each. The counties included in the 12 data reporting areas can be found in Figure 1.
The county-level cropland cash rental rates are averaged over counties in each area.
Figure 2 presents the historical deflated cash rental rates for five types of farmland in area
1 over the period 1994-2008. All cash rental rates data are deflated by Indexes of Prices Paid
by Farmers in the sample period, which are obtained from the USDA Annual Prices Summary
(1994-2008).3 The deflated rents for each type of farmland did not vary much until 2007.
Averaged over farmland in all areas, cash rental rates for 2007-2008 increased by 11% compared
3The data are obtained from http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/, last visited 9/28/2008.
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with the level for 1994-2006. While cropped land cash rental rates increased by only 3% in real
terms over the year 2007-2008, the rates of increase for alfalfa hay, grass hay, improved pasture,
and unimproved pasture farmland are much higher at 13%, 9%, 13%, and 16%, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the log of real cash rental rates in area 1 for five types of farmland included in
this study. It indicates that cash rental rates of non-cropped farmland exhibit higher variation
than those of cropland. This may be due in part to noisier information on non-cropped farmland
because these markets are not as active as cropped land rental markets. Figure 4 presents
cash rents of non-cropped farmland relative to those of cropped land. Unimproved permanent
pastureland has the lowest cash rental rates, while alfalfa hay land has the highest rents. All
relative rent series show a slight increase over the sample period.
Before exploring the major issues, we conduct a simple regression analysis on the rents data
to understand the basic relationship. This preliminary estimate should be viewed as motivation
for further investigation in this study. OLS regression results of rents of non-cropped farmland
on cropped land cash rental rates and time are summarized in Table 1. The results indicate
that, on average, for a 1% change in cropped land cash rental rates, cash rents increase by
0.77%, 0.66%, 1.91%, and 1.95% for improved pastureland, permanent pastureland, alfalfa hay,
and grass hay land. All responses to cropped land rent are positive and statistically significant.
Only the cash rents for permanent pastureland show a significant time trend.
While changes of cash rents for non-cropped farmland are in the same direction as those
of cropland, they differ in magnitude. Hayland, closest in quality to cropland, demonstrates
sensitivity beyond unit elasticity, while the sensitivity of pastureland is less than 1. This makes
some intuitive sense. The state has comparatively little land under hay, which is bulky and
costly to transport. As some of the land under hay enters into row crop production, hay land
rents may increase markedly in the face of local hay scarcity.
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Empirical Analysis
In this section, we justify the linkage between crop prices and the amount of cropped land
by analyzing the effect of product market prices on shares of cropped land in total farmland.
Expected corn and soybean prices, hay and feeder cattle prices, and the soil quality index are
considered to be important factors to explain changes of cropped land shares. Then, employing
a panel data regression model, we further analyze the determinants of cash rental rates for four
types of non-cropped farmland. To determine the contributing factors of cash rental rates for
non-cropped farmland, we consider the following explanatory variables: expected corn, soybean,
and feeder cattle prices; population density; non-cropland soil quality; and proportion of non-
cropland in each data reporting area. We first discuss each of the chosen explanatory variables
and its relationship to the dependent variables.
Feeder Cattle Price: In Iowa, pastureland rental agreements are typically renegotiated and
renewed in the fall of each year. Higher feeder cattle prices may induce higher demand for
pastureland and put downward pressure on cropland shares. Feeder cattle are the major output
of rented pastureland and are typically marketed around November. The expected market prices
for feeder cattle should be important in the determination of pastureland rents. As previously
assumed, tenant farmers use futures prices to formulate their price expectations when entering
rental contracts. The expected prices are represented by average December settlement prices
of futures contracts expiring in November the following year over the period 1994-2008.
Corn and Soybean Prices: Harvest-time corn and soybean price expectations influence farm-
ers’ planting and land allocation decisions, which are typically formulated in April each year.
Corn and soybeans are major alternative feed sources for feeder cattle production. These prices
are also likely the main way by which biofuel expansion affects non-cropped farmland rental
markets. As with feeder cattle, we use the prices on the harvest-time futures contract traded
on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) to proxy the expected corn and soybean prices. In
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this case, they are averaged over the average daily settlement prices of December (November)
futures contracts of corn (soybeans) with expiration of December (November) the following
year.
Population Density: Alternative farmland uses such as urban expansion, recreational pur-
poses, and other non-farming motives may put upward pressure on farmland cash rental rates.
Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007) find that cropped land cash rents are significantly higher
for counties closer to big metropolitan areas. Livanis et al. (2006) describe and empirically
confirm important impacts of urban sprawl on farmland values. Recreational demand will be
affected by scenic endowments, hunting possibilities, and the spatial distribution of income and
access, among other factors. To simplify, we consider that the influence of alternative land uses
should increase with population size in the corresponding area. We use each area’s population
density, measured by population per square mile, to capture this effect. The population and
area data are obtained from the U.S. Census of 2000.4
Cropped land and non-cropped land CSR: Farmland soil quality is another important factor
in farmers’ production decisions. The county average corn suitability rating (CSR) index is
employed in this study to reflect soil quality of all land. It is a farmland productivity index
ranging from 0 to 100 with the higher number indicating higher land productivity. Index values
are obtained from Iowa State University Extension (1994-2008).
We calculate the acreage-weighted CSR for cropped land in each data reporting area as
follows:5 (a) sort farmland acreage in each county by CSR index of each soil type in descending
order; (b) find the cropped land cutoff point by matching the accumulated acres to actual crop
planting acreage; (c) calculate county-weighted average CSR indices for cropped farmland; (d)
calculate weighted average area CSR indices for cropped farmland in each area. The calculation
4The data are obtained from http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html, last visited 9/28/08.
5We obtain similar and consistent results when using other general soil quality indices such as the average
slope and land capability class (LCC) calculated from the National Resource Inventory (NRI) database.
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of average CSR for non-cropped land is similar to that of cropped land. Although the CSR index
is intended to measure row-crop productivity, the attributes underlying high-quality cropland
are also good for forage crops.
Proportion of non-cropped farmland: Previously we found that demand for forage land
should affect how the corn market influences rent for lower-quality land. So the supply of
non-cropped farmland is another important factor in determining rental prices. For example,
if a large amount of pastureland is available in a given area and few farmers demand extra pas-
ture, rents should tend to be low. Likewise, if there is little pasture acreage for rent but many
farmers demand extra pasture, rents may be bid higher. We use the proportion of non-cropped
farmland in total farmland as reported in U.S. Census of Agriculture (2002) to capture the
relative availability of non-cropped farmland.
It is worth mentioning that the hay price is not included in regression analyses in this study.
Hay prices in May each year, obtained from USDA’s Agricultural Price Annual Summary over
the sample period, is studied to explain their exclusion from regressions. Figure 5 presents the
deflated prices and production of three types of hay, including all hay, alfalfa hay, and other
hay, in Iowa over the period 1980-2007. While production levels are stable in the sample period,
especially after 1990, hay prices vary much more. Applying a cumulative periodogram white
noise test on the deflated hay price series of 1990-2007, we get a Bartlett Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(BKS) test statistic of 0.34 with a P-value of 0.9998 (Fuller, 1995). We fail to reject the null
hypothesis of white noise. The result means that the reported hay price is noisy and hard to
explain by local production. Demand should evolve gradually as local livestock sectors expand
or contract, so that demand side events are unlikely to be the cause either. Supply variability
at the margin from more drought-prone areas just west of Iowa may be a cause for seemingly
excess price volatility.
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Change of cropped land shares
In the theoretical model, we assume that an increase in crop prices should reduce the amount
of non-cropped land. Because annual acreage data on non-cropped land are not available, we
turn to justifying the assumption that higher crop prices increase the amount of cropped land
given the fixed amount of total farmland. Cropped land shares are calculated as the shares of
corn and soybean planted acres in total farmland for each county over the period 1980-2007.
The planting acreage data are downloaded from the National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS) website.6
Cropped land shares among neighboring counties are correlated, possibly because of similar
weather and soil quality conditions. To correct for the cross-sectional correlations, we apply the
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimator in the panel data setting (Greene, 2003,
p. 322). The estimation results, which are presented in Table 2, show that an increase in corn
price induces farmland to shift from other crops such as forage crops to row crop production.
The negative coefficient on expected soybean price is mainly due to multicollinearity between
corn and soybean prices. The estimation result for corn price only included in Table 2 indicates
a significant and positive effect on cropland shares. We notice that the signs for feeder cattle
are unexpectedly positive, which requires further investigation.
Determinants of cash rental rates of non-cropped farmland
For illustration, average cash rental rates for improved pastureland of 12 areas in 2008 are
shown in Figure 6. Prices are highest in areas 1, 5, and 6, where there is a large feedlot
industry, and also in areas 4 and 9 with a large milk production industry. It is lowest in area
2, which concentrates on row crop and hog production.
All price and price-related variables are deflated by Indexes of Prices Paid by Farmers over
6The data are obtained from www.nass.usda.gov.
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the sample period. Three panel unit root tests are applied on the four deflated cash rental
rates time series to ensure the stationarity property of the cash rent time series and so the
appropriateness of using level data in regression analysis. The tests include the Levin-Lin-Chu
test (Levin, Lin, and Chu, 2002; LLC hereafter), Im-Pesaran-Shin test (Im, Pesaran, and Shin,
2003; IPS hereafter), and Pesaran’s CADF test (Pesaran, 2007). The tests results, shown in
Table 3, indicate that the rent series on all four non-cropped farmland rent series are stationary.
The panel data regression is based on the data set of 12 reporting areas over the period 1994
through 2008. The cash rental data are characterized by spatial and serial autocorrelations.
The correct estimation procedure involves explicitly incorporating spatial and temporal auto-
correlation and regional heterogeneity. We expect the cash rental rates data to be positively
correlated over space mainly because of the geographic configuration of the 12 data reporting
areas. Temporal autocorrelation is possible because landowners and tenant farmers usually
prefer formal or informal longer-term rental agreements. Pastureland and hay land involve
capital investments, including liming and seeding, that need to be recouped over several years.
So tenant farmers and landowners may not respond to market changes annually (Yoder et al.,
2008).
Pesaran’s CD test (2004) and Friedman’s non-parametric test (1937) for cross-sectional de-
pendence are applied on the panel data set of all four types of non-crop farmland rents. The
test results are presented in Table 4; all tests strongly reject the null hypotheses of no cross-
sectional dependence, at least at the 5% significance level. In addition, Wooldridge’s test for
autocorrelation in panel data (2002, p. 282) provides a significant F statistic, confirming the
existence of serial autocorrelation.
Individual heterogeneity is taken into account using the random effects estimator. The χ2
statistic for Hausman’s specification test of fixed/random effect estimators is calculated as 4.3
with P > χ2 = 0.12 (Greene, 2003, p. 301). So we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
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heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the regressors. This means that we can assume the random
effects estimator is consistent and asymptotically efficient. Thus, we conclude that the random
effect panel data model incorporating spatial and serial correlations is appropriate for our study.
The random effects panel data model is written as
(14) Yit = X
′
itβ + εit for i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T.
which can be stacked as
Yt = X
′
tβ + εt t = 1, ..., T
where the dimensions of the including variables are Yt = [N × 1], Xt = [N × k], and εt =
[N×1]. Vector β has dimension k×1 and represents the estimated coefficients for k explanatory
variables. Vector Yt denotes cash rental rates for non-cropped farmland over areas i ∈ 1, ..., N
in year t, while Xt are the variables discussed above. Disturbance term εt can be expressed as
follows to explicitly take into account spatial and serial correlations:
εt = δWεt + νt,
νt = ρνt−1 + et.(15)
Vectors εt, νt, and et all have the same dimensions, [N ×1]. Parameter δ is the spatial autocor-
relation coefficient and ρ denotes the temporal autocorrelation coefficient. Error eit is assumed
to be independently and identically distributed as N(0, σ2). The matrix W is the spatial con-
tiguity matrix having dimensions [N ×N ] . Basically, the matrix is a square table with cells of
one or zero to indicate whether the areas mentioned in the rows and columns are contiguous or
not. Reviewing Figure 1, the value of one indicates that the two areas have a common border
and hence are contiguous. The diagonal elements of W are all zero. Following the concentrated
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maximum likelihood estimation procedure in Elhorst (2008), the estimated coefficient vectors
β for the four types of non-cropped farmland are reported in Table 5.
In the four sets of regression results, spatial and temporal autocorrelation coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The temporal autocorrelation coefficients
are estimated to be from 0.59 to 0.74, while spatial autocorrelation coefficients are in the range of
0.21 to 0.29. The sets of regression results for hay land, including alfalfa hay and grass hay land,
are quite different from those for pastureland, including improved and unimproved pastureland.
Almost all independent variables included in pastureland regressions are statistically significant
to explain the rental price variation, while only corn price and non-cropped CSR are marginally
significant in the hay land regressions. This is also indicated by the comparatively low values
for the first two columns of Table 5. As we mentioned before, this may be because of the noisy
nature of the rental price information of hay land.
We now focus on the improved pastureland. It is sufficiently distinct from land under row
crops but is of greater commercial relevance than unimproved pasture. Table 6 presents re-
gression results on improved pastureland cash rents under different model specifications, which
involve excluding the soybean price and making alternative assumptions on the model specifi-
cation autocorrelation structure. All results are consistent with the original model specification
shown in Column 1 of Table 6, demonstrating robustness in the regressions. In the results, the
expected corn price has a significant positive effect on cash rental prices, which further verifies
our main hypothesis in this study that increasing biofuel demand for corn pushes up not only
the cropped land cash rents as found in Du, Hennessy, and Edwards (2007), but also the rents
for other non-cropped farmland.
The negative sign of the soybean price may result from the high correlation between corn
and soybean prices. For the regressions excluding soybean price in Column 2 of Table 6, the
coefficient of the corn price remains significantly positive. As hypothesized, the expected feeder
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cattle price is found to increase significantly the pastureland rents. Share of non-cropped land
in a given area is another important contributing factor to explain variations in the cash rental
rates. A higher proportion of non-cropped land as identified by Census of Agriculture imposes
downward pressure on land rental prices.7 The results also indicate that competition from
alternative uses of pastureland nudges up land rent slightly. This effect is indicated by the
population density variable, which is estimated to be small and only marginally significant at
the 10% level.
Conclusion
This study has investigated the comparative relationships between cropped land and non-
cropped land cash rents through theoretical and empirical analyses. In the theoretical model,
the possible linkage is identified as a substitution relationship between lands of different innate
fertilities. A higher corn price induces land use conversion from non-cropped land to corn pro-
duction, reducing the number of acres used for hay and pasture. Demand from feeder cattle
production also pushes up non-cropped land cash rental rates. This issue is further investigated
in the empirical analysis, including estimates of foraged land rent sensitivities to cropped land
rents and a panel data regression model. The empirics find that (a) a higher corn price does
lead to an increase in the cash rental prices for non-cropped farmland, and the increase can
be elastic with respect to rents for cropped land; (b) a higher corn price does induce a higher
share of cropped land; (c) besides corn and soybean prices, other determinants of non-cropped
land cash rental rates include the expected feeder cattle price, population density, soil quality,
and the proportion of non-cropped farmland.
Current ethanol policy can be viewed as the equilibrium outcome from political pressures
7The proportion of non-cropped farmland is probably endogenous and correlated with the determinants of
non-cropped land cash rental rates.
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brought to bear by interested parties, including corn growers and livestock producers. While
farmers who buy corn to feed their livestock lose from current ethanol policies, this study
indicates that tenant farmers who rent non-cropped land for grazing are also harmed through
increasing cash rental rates. On the one hand, higher feed prices should depress the market
price of feeder cattle leaving the cow-calf sector. On the other hand, non-farming owners of
lower quality land gain from the policies. The overall effect on cow-calf operators who own
their land is unclear, as their incomes are subject to two opposing forces.
There are several possible further extensions to this study, and we mention two. Higher
returns to corn production likely encourage Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) acres to re-
enter crop production at contract expiration. However, not all CRP acres are prime cropped
land, and these acres could be used for hay or pasture. But low-grade land may be used to
produce cellulosic ethanol as feedstock for second-generation ethanol production. Were it to
occur on a large scale, cropping for cellulosic ethanol would create a more direct demand for
non-prime farmland, would likely put upward pressure on their rents, and may place downward
pressure on prime farmland rates. So the long-run equilibrium effect of ethanol policy on
lower-grade land is as yet unclear.
There is a literature on the political economy of pass-through for government subsidies
(e.g., Lence and Mishra, 2003; Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins, 2003). Conventional wisdom
based on Ricardian rent theory suggests that landowners, who are often stylized as the owners
of the most limiting resource, should have the bargaining power to ensure that they receive
all benefits. But econometric analysis has identified imperfect pass-through for government
subsidies. Historically, it is fair to say that farm policies have not been directed at lower-grade
land. Whether land under hay and pasture, which have not been subsidized crops, have actually
benefited from government payments through substitution effects is an open question.
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Appendix
Derivatives are
Sc
θˆ
(θˆ) = nθ(θˆ)B
[∫ 1
θˆ
dG(s)
]
pc − n(θˆ)B′
[∫ 1
θˆ
dG(s)
]
g(θˆ)pc > 0;
Sf
θˆ
(θˆ, θˆ) = mθ(θˆ)p
f > 0;
Tθˆ(θˆ) = m(θˆ)A
′[0]g(θˆ)pf + pfg(θˆ)
∫ θˆ
0
m(θ)A
′′
[∫ θˆ
θ
dG(s)
]
dG(θ).
Thus, the sign of Sc
θˆ
(θˆ)−Sf
θˆ
(θˆ, θˆ)−Tθˆ(θˆ) is not certain without further structural assumptions.
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Table 1. OLS Regression of Non-cropped on Cropped Land Rents
Log(cropped land rents) Time R2
Log(alfalfa hay land rents) 1.92*** -0.00066 0.5067
(13.48) (-0.49)
Log(grass hay land rents) 1.96*** -0.0013 0.4943
(13.21) (-0.90)
Log(improved pastureland rents) 0.76*** 0.001 0.3478
(9.60) (1.37)
Log(permanent pastureland rents) 0.63*** 0.0028*** 0.2055
(6.64) (3.15)
Note: Single(*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10,
0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. t values are in the parentheses.
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Table 2. Panel FGLS Regression Results for Cropped Land
Shares
with soybean price without soybean price
Expected corn price 0.027*** 0.023***
(10.17) (2.89)
Expected soybean price -0.056*** —
(-4.53)
Expected feeder cattle price 0.0019*** 0.0023***
(21.26) (6.64)
CSR 0.0062*** 0.0062***
(116.63) (115.40)
Constant 0.036*** -0.014*
(2.85) (-1.42)
Note: Single(*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at
the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. z values are in the parentheses.
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Table 3. Panel Unit Root Tests for Deflated Cash Rental Rates
Test Alfalfa hay Grass hay Improved pasture Unimproved pasture
LLC -9.229*** -9.774*** -7.699*** -8.987***
IPS -2.448*** -2.544*** -2.295*** -2.424***
CADF -3.624*** -3.210*** -2.880*** -2.954***
Note: Single(*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at
the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively.
Table 4. Tests for Cross-sectional Dependence in Panel Data Model
Test Alfalfa hay Grass hay Improved pasture Unimproved pasture
Pesaran’s CD test 1.986*** 1.623*** 3.319*** 5.216***
Friedman’s test 25.108*** 17.667*** 24.283*** 40.550***
Note: Rows with Pesaran’s CD test and Friedman’s test report the t values for the cross-
sectional dependence tests. Single(*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote signif-
icance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. The null hypothesis of no cross-sectional
dependence is rejected if the test statistic is significant.
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Table 5. Panel Regression Results
Alfalfa hay Grass hay Improved pasture Unimproved pasture
Corn price 14.59** 8.04 9.36*** 3.23*
(2.43) (1.53) (3.86) (1.67)
Soybean price -3.18 -2.21 -2.10*** -0.51
(-1.29) (-1.03) (-2.24) (-0.67)
Feeder cattle price 0.05 0.12 0.16*** 0.10***
(0.50) (1.25) (3.64) (2.84)
Population density 0.027 0.04 0.028* 0.025**
(0.51) (0.88) (1.92) (2.30)
Non-cropped land CSR -1.02* -0.83 -0.52*** -0.37***
(-1.71) (-1.58) (-3.34) (-3.07)
% of non-cropped land -34.67 -23.91 -14.62*** -11.33***
(1.60) (-1.26) (-3.05) (-2.84)
Constant 108.55*** 82.99*** 38.24*** 30.48***
(3.66) (3.20) (4.59) (4.61)
Temporal auto. 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.59*** 0.60***
(25.18) (24.83) (9.88) (10.53)
Spatial auto. 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.29***
(24.61) (24.26) (2.23) (3.32)
R2 0.7005 0.6402 0.8567 0.8176
Note: Single(*), double (**), and triple (***) asterisks denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01
levels, respectively.
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Figure 1. Rent Data Reporting Areas in Iowa
Figure 2. Average Historical Deflated Cash Rental Rates,
1994-2008
30
Figure 3. Log of Deflated Cash Rental Rates of Area 1,
1994-2008
Figure 4. Relative Cash Rents of Non-cropped to Cropped
Farmland
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Figure 5. Deflated Hay Prices and Production in Iowa,
1980-2007
Figure 6. Cash Rental Rates for Improved Pastureland, 2008
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